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Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two parties to establish a secret key over a potentially
hostile channel by exchanging photonic quantum states, relying on the fact that it is impossible
for an eavesdropper to tap the quantum channel without disturbing these photons in a way that
can be detected [1]. Here we introduce a large-alphabet QKD protocol that makes optimal use of
temporal and spectral correlations of entangled photons, reaching the maximum number of inde-
pendent basis states (the Schmidt number) and enabling extremely high information content per
photon together with an optimal rate of secret key generation. This protocol, which we call ‘Dense
Wavelength Division Multiplexed Quantum Key Distribution’ (DWDM-QKD), derives its security
by the conjugate nature of the temporal and spectral entanglement of photon pairs generated by
spontaneous parametric down conversion. By using a combination of spectral and temporal bases,
we can adjust the protocol to be resource efficient. We show that DWDM-QKD is well suited to
approach the optimal key generation rate using present-day sources, detectors, and DWDM opti-
cal networks from classical communications, as well as emerging optical interconnect and photonic
integrated chip (PIC) systems.
There has been growing interest in QKD schemes employing photons in high dimensional Hilbert
spaces, resulting in a potentially very large-alphabet size [1, 2]. Different degrees of freedom have
been considered, including temporal [3, 4] and spatial modes [5]. Ultimately, the number of bits per
photon is limited by the number of independent basis states spanning the Hilbert space, given by the
Schmidt decomposition. While previous large-alphabet protocols in the temporal basis have reached
up to 16 time bins [4] with a bit error rate of 5%, they were not able to reach the Schmidt number
because, in practical situations, the detector timing jitter greatly exceeds the correlation time of
entangled photons generated by typical spontaneous parametric down conversion (SPDC) sources.
We overcome this limitation by employing temporal and spectral correlations simultaneously to
match the performance of present-day detectors. Thus, given a certain detected-pair flux n and
phase-matching bandwidth ∆Ω, the DWDM-QKD protocol proposed here allows two parties, Alice
and Bob, to generate a secure key at the maximum rate possible in the time-frequency bases. In
particular, DWDM-QKD enables Alice and Bob to generate their shared key at a maximum rate of
n log2(∆Ω/n). Here, ∆Ω/n corresponds to the maximum number of independent time-frequency
states in time interval of duration 1/n, and thus the maximum number of bits per photons is given
by log2(∆Ω/n).
We consider time-frequency entangled photon pairs with a correlation time σcor produced by
frequency-degenerate SPDC [6], assuming a pump field at frequency ωp with coherence time σcoh.
In the weak pumping limit, the down-converted photon pair can be approximated by the state
|Ψ〉 = ∫∞−∞ ∫∞−∞ ψ(tA, tB) |tA, tB〉 dtAdtB , where |tA, tB〉 = aˆ†A(tA)aˆ†B(tB) |0〉, and aˆ†A,B(tj) denote
the creation operators at time tj for Alice and Bob, and ψ(tA, tB) is the normalized time-domain
biphoton wave function. This state can be written equivalently in the spectral domain, |Ψω〉 =∫∞
−∞
∫∞
−∞ ψ(ωA, ωB) |ωA, ωB〉 dωAdωB , where ψ(ωA, ωB) = FT2{ψ(tA, tB)} and FT2 denotes the
two-dimensional Fourier transform. In these expressions, time and frequency represent conjugate
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2bases that can be employed to generate a secure key [2]. Specifically, we first discretize the biphoton
state into nt orthogonal temporal basis states, |σibin〉, of duration σbin, given by |σibin,A, σibin,B〉 =∫ (i+1)σbin
iσbin
∫ (i+1)σbin
iσbin
ψ(tA, tB) |tA, tB〉 dtAdtB , and alternatively into nω orthogonal spectral basis
states, |νi〉, of bandwidth δν, given by |νiA, νiB〉 =
∫ (i+1)δν
iδν
∫ (i+1)δν
iδν
ψ(ωA, ωB) |ωA, ωB〉 dωAdωB . We
assume σbin > σcor and δν > 1/σcoh. nt and nω are bounded by the Schmidt number, K = ntnω.
In the protocol, Alice creates a biphoton pair, keeps one photon for herself, and sends the other
photon to Bob. Alice and Bob randomly switch between measurements in the temporal (nt = K,
nω = 1) and spectral (nt = 1, nω = K) bases at intervals of T = 1/n. After a certain time, they
publicly compare their basis choices and divide their measurements into three categories, in which
they (i) both detected photons and measured in the same basis set, (ii) both detected photons and
measured in different basis sets, and (iii) did not both measure a photon. They discard category
(iii) measurements. Type (i) measurements should be perfectly correlated, providing Alice and Bob
with the raw sifted key. Eve does not know in which basis Alice and Bob are observing, and will
therefore measure in the wrong basis set half of the time. If, for example, Alice and Bob do spectral
measurements and Eve does a temporal measurement, she spreads the photon pair in frequency
and increases the error probability in the type-(i) measurements, revealing her presence to Alice
and Bob.
The use of two conjugate bases ensures security in the DWDM-QKD protocol. While measure-
ments in these bases is practical for relatively small basis size, the demands on instruments become
unrealistic for larger bases; for instance, generating the secure key at 10 bits per photon would
require a minimum basis size of 1024, and therefore as many detectors (in a continuously running
scheme). The temporal measurements present an additional a challenge because typical SPDC
sources at 1550 nm produce photon pairs with σcor ∼ 1 ps for type-II phase-matched periodically
poled KTiOPO4 (PPKTP) (σcor ∼ 0.04 ps for type-0 phase-matched periodically poled LiNbO3
(PPLN)), which corresponds to a bandwidth of ∼4 nm (∼100 nm). No detector exists to measure
such short time bins continuously [12]. This timing mismatch between practical detectors and prac-
tical sources implies that the realizable number of time bins nt < K. When Alice and Bob measure
in the temporal domain, they cannot check arrival temporal correlations to their fundamental limit.
For instance, if the detector jitter is σdet ∼ 30 ps, as for SNSPD detectors [7], then nt/K ≈ 1/30,
as indicated in the temporal measurement in Fig. 1a. As a result, Alice and Bob reduce the dimen-
sionality of communication in the temporal domain from the Schmidt number [8], K ≈ σcoh/σcor to
K ′ < σcoh/σdet, and Eve can obtain finite spectral information without creating observable errors
in the temporal basis. This example illustrates that in general, technological limitations reduce the
number of basis states far below the fundamental limit.
To solve this problem, Alice and Bob can employ a hybrid basis that constitutes a superposition
of temporal and spectral states. They measure in the temporal basis with resolution σbin and
simultaneously in the spectral basis with resolution (σbin)
−1. In this case, the maximum number of
time bins becomes nt = σcoh/σbin and the number of spectral bins becomes nω = σbin/σcor so that
the total alphabet size becomes ntnω = σcoh/σcor, which recovers the original Schmidt number, K.
Now photons are measured in the spectral and temporal basis simultaneously, as shown in Figs. 1b
and 1d.
The key generation rate depends on the phase-matching bandwidth, ∆Ω, and the number of
photon pairs available for transmission. Alice and Bob can choose to transmit a single pair over
this bandwidth, or can split the spectrum into some number of channels, Nc, each with photon flux,
n/Nc. In both cases, the maximum key generation rate evaluates to
R ≈ n log2
(
∆Ω
n
)
. (1)
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FIG. 1: (a) The temporal-coding scheme. A strong laser pumps a nonlinear crystal. Photons pairs are
generated by SPDC and sent across channels of equal length to Alice and Bob who measure their arrival
times. (b) Time bins agreed upon by Alice and Bob over a public channel. If a photon pair is detected in
a given time bin, then that character is shared between Alice and Bob. (c) Alice and Bob place a DWDM
before their detectors to obtain spectral information. (d) The new two-dimensional state space.
In Fig. 2a, we plot this relationship for two typical sources in the telecom band: a 1-cm type-II
phase-matched PPKTP crystal generating photons pairs at 1550 nm with a 4 nm bandwidth; and
a 2-cm type-0 phase-matched PPLN crystal at 1550 nm with a 100 nm bandwidth. Alice and Bob
can generate a key at almost 20 bpp and 2 Gb/s using the PPLN source.
A careful analysis must take into account the finite overlap of the basis states. When we
include this overlap as well as the detector timing jitter, we can calculate the mutual informa-
tion between Alice and Bob as I(A,B) = H(A) + H(B) − H(A,B), using the Shannon entropy,
H = −∑{x} p{x} log p{x}, where {x} is the complete set of indices spanning a probability density
function p. We evaluate I(A,B) in Appendix II A and plot the results in Fig. 2b, as a function of
the number of Gaussian spectral channels, and the number of time bins. We use Gaussian channels
to approximate modern DWDM filters. The continuous lines represent the ideal information per
photon, and the data points represent our simulated results for the mutual information using a two-
dimensional Gaussian, ψ(tA, tB) ∝ e−(tA−tB)2/4σ2core−(tA+tB)2/4σ2cohe−iωp(tA+tB)/2, for the biphoton
wave function, where ωp is the pump frequency. For a small number of spectral channels, we see
good agreement. For large numbers, the Gaussian filters slightly underperform the ideal result due
to crosstalk in the closely spaced temporal and spectral bins. This is evident in Fig. 2b for 32
spectral channels with FWHM of (nωσcor)
−1 and channel spacing 4(nωσcor)−1, and two 40 ps time
bins.
Our formalism also enables us to study the effect of detector timing jitter. The results are plotted
in the inset in Fig. 2b and show that the mutual information drops rapidly when the timing jitter
approaches the time bin duration.
The security check employing conjugate bases in purely frequency and time relies on the mutu-
ally unbiased nature of these bases; a measurement in the wrong basis reveals no information about
the state in the other basis and by their conjugate nature introduces errors. We therefore seek a
mutually unbiased basis to that employed in our resource-efficient scheme. Alice and Bob’s coarse
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Quantum key distribution (QKD) enables two parties to establish a secret key over a potentially
hostile channel by exchanging photonic quantum states, relying on the fact that it is impossible
for an eavesdropper to tap the quantum channel without disturbing these photons in a way that
can be detected [1]. Here we introduce a large-alphabet QKD protocol that makes optimal use of
temporal and spectral correlations of entangled photons, reaching the maximum number of inde-
pendent basis states (the Schmidt number) and enabling extremely high information content per
photon together with an optimal rate of secret key generation. This protocol, which we call ‘Dense
Wavelength Division Multiplexed Quantum Key Distribution’ (DWDM-QKD), derives its security
by the conjugate nature of the temporal and spectral entanglement of photon pairs generated by
spontaneous parametric down conversion. By using a combination of spectral and temporal bases,
we can adjust the protocol to be resource efficient. We show that DWDM-QKD is well suited to
approach the optimal key generation rate using present-day sources, detectors, and DWDM opti-
cal networks from classical communications, as well as emerging optical interconnect and photonic
integrated chip (PIC) systems.
σdet/σbin (1)
There has been growing interest in QKD schemes employing photons in high dimensional Hilbert
spaces, resulting in a potentially very large-alphabet size [1, 2]. Different degrees of freedom have
been considered, including temporal [3, 4] and spatial modes [5]. Ultimately, the number of bits per
photon is limited by the number of independent basis states spanning the Hilbert space, given by the
Schmidt decomposition. While previous large-alphabet protocols in the temporal basis have reached
up to 16 time bins [4] with a bit error rate of 5%, they were not able to reach the Schmidt number
because, in practical situations, the detector timing jitter greatly exceeds the correlation time of
entangled photons generated by typical spontaneous parametric down conversion (SPDC) sources.
We overcome this limitation by employing temporal and spectral correlations simultaneously to
match the performance of present-day detectors. Thus, given a certain detected-pair flux n and
phase-matching bandwidth ∆Ω, the DWDM-QKD protocol proposed here allows two parties, Alice
and Bob, to generate a secure key at the maximum rate possible in the time-frequency bases. In
particular, DWDM-QKD enables Alice and Bob to generate their shared key at a maximum rate of
n log2(∆Ω/n). Here, ∆Ω/n corresponds to the maximum number of independent time-frequency
states in time interval of duration 1/n, and thus the maximum number of bits per photons is given
by log2(∆Ω/n).
We consider time-frequency entangled photon pairs with a correlation time σcor produced by
frequency-degenerate SPDC [6], assuming a pump field at frequency ωp with coherence time σcoh.
In the weak pumping limit, the down-converted photon pair can be approximated by the state
|Ψ￿ = ￿∞−∞ ￿∞−∞ ψ(tA, tB) |tA, tB￿ dtAdtB , where |tA, tB￿ = aˆ†A(tA)aˆ†B(tB) |0￿, and aˆ†A,B(tj) denote
the creation operators at time tj for Alice and Bob, and ψ(tA, tB) is the normalized time-domain
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FIG. 2: (a) Key exchange rate and bits per photon as a function of phas -matching ban width and photo
flux. (b) Mutual information as a function of the number of spectral channels, nω. The i dividual spectr l
channels have bandwidth δν = ∆ω/nω and spacing 4δν. Increasing the number of spectral channels increases
the bits per photon, until the time duration of the filtered photon approaches σbin. The inset shows mutual
information as a function of detector timing jitter, σdet, normalized to σbin.
measurements in spectrum are described by an operator that projects subsets of spectral states
onto degenerate eigenvalues Ωl. The degeneracy within these subsets is lifted by also performing
measurements in time, which are described by an operator with coarse timing resolution Tm that
correspond to degenerate sets of eigenstates. Simultaneous eigenstates for time and spectral mea-
surements |ΩlTm〉 describe one basis set. A conjugate basis can be found that forms the second
basis for measurements by Alice and Bob.
Under certain conditions, a security check can be performed using simple instrumentation. For
now, we assume that Eve chooses to attack by using either a Gaussian envelope in time or one in
frequency, i.e., Eˆt =
∫∞
−∞ e
−t2/2(σEcoh)2 |t〉 〈t| dt [4] or Eˆω =
∫∞
−∞ e
−(σEcor)2(ω−ωp/2)2 |ω〉 〈ω| dω, respec-
tively. Eve’s temporal measurement leads to a decrease in σcoh, and her frequency measurement
creates an increase in the biphoton correlation time, σcor. Alice and Bob can detect both of these
attacks with the ‘extended Franson interferometer’ (eFI) shown in Fig. 3. The eFI is composed of
two unbalanced Mach-Zehnder interferometers (MZI) in the possession of Alice and Bob, where the
long path on one arm can be actively modulated.
The probability for Alice and Bob to detect a photon coincidence in their eFI is [9]
PC ∝ 1
2
+
1
2
cos[ω(2∆t− δt)]e−δt2/8σ2core−∆t2/8σ2coh , (2)
where ω = ωp/2 is the center frequency of the SPDC signal and idler photons, ∆t is the path-length
difference between the long and short arm of Alice’s MZI, and δt is the path-length difference
between Alice’s and Bob’s long arm. ∆t is large enough to avoid single photon interference between
long and short paths of a single arm of the eFI, and δt is varied on the order of 1/ω about zero. The
interference is plotted in Fig. 3 as a function of an additional delay in Alice’s MZI. This interference
curve shows the oscillations in PC that is typical of the Franson interferometer near δt = 0. In
addition, this oscillation has a Gaussian envelope whose width is given by σcor.
The visibility of the eFI interference is V = e−δt
2/8σ2core−∆t
2/8σ2coh . If Eve measures in the
temporal domain with a resolution better than ∆t, then Alice and Bob can detect a drop in V
near δt = 0; this is the security check used by Kahn et. al in Ref. [4]. On the other hand, if Eve
measures in the spectral domain with a resolution better than ∆Ω, then Alice and Bob can detect
5SPDC
PC
PBS
BS
D
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 ∆t ￿fs￿0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
PC
0 2 4 6 8 101214 ∆t ￿fs￿3200fs￿0.20.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
PC
0 2 4 6 8 101214 ∆t ￿fs￿3200fs￿0.20.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
PC
Thursday, October 20, 2011
FIG. 3: The eFI used for security checks. Alice switches the short arm of her Franson between lengths δt1
and δt2. This allows determination of both σcoh and σcor so that weak spectral and temporal measurements
on the photon pair can be detected. Alice and Bob do security checks by varying δt as shown in the insets.
We show one possible switching scheme that makes use of Pockels cells (PC) to rotate the polarization of
the photon by pi/2 so that it is either transmitted or reflected at the polarizing beam splitter (PBS) and sent
to the extended or standard delay line, respectively. The eFI also includes non-polarizing beam splitters
(BS) and single photon detectors (D).
an increase in V near δt = σcor. To guard against temporal and spectral measurements by Eve
simultaneously, Alice and Bob measure V while Alice switches randomly between delays of 0 and
σcor (see Fig. 3).
Alice and Bob can deduce the correlation time and coherence time from two visibility measure-
ments V1 and V2 using two delays, δt1 and δt2, respectively. We label these extrapolated values
σE
′
coh and σ
E′
cor, which are given by
(σE
′
cor)
2 =
1
8
δt21 − δt22
lnV2 − lnV1 (3)
(σE
′
coh)
2 =
1
8
∆t2(δt21 − δt22)
δt21 lnV2 − δt22 lnV1
. (4)
Using (σEcoh)
2 = 1/[(σE
′
coh)
−2−σ−2coh] and (σEcor)2 = 1/[(σE
′
cor)
−2−σ−2cor] derived from this measurement,
the bound on Eve’s information per photon is IE ≤ log2(σcoh/σEcoh) + log2(σEcor/σcor), which is the
sum of her information obtained from temporal and spectral measurements. Our assumption of a
Gaussian form of Eve’s POVM will be generalized in future work.
6I. CONCLUSION
The often limited photon budget for quantum key distribution makes high-dimensional encoding
desirable. However, achieving the limit on this dimensionality in the temporal domain using
time-frequency entangled photon pairs requires detectors with sub-ps timing jitter and resolution.
By invoking conjugate spectral correlations, we present a protocol to approach this fundamental
limit using current detectors and existing telecom networks. The conjugate nature of temporal and
spectral encoding means that one can trade spectral for temporal bits (and vice versa) to minimize
the effect of channel distortion such as nonlinear frequency conversion and dispersion, in addition
to optimizing over transmission rate and channel bandwidth.
This work was supported by the DARPA Information in a Photon program, through grant
W911NF-10-1-0416 from the Army Research Office.
II. METHODS
A. Mutual information
Alice and Bob ideally communicate information by discretizing the wave function into agreed-
upon time-bin |σibin〉 and frequency-bin |νi〉 macrostates by
|Ψ¯〉 =
∑
i,j,k,l
Gi,j,k,l |σibin,A, σjbin,B , νkA, νlB〉 , (5)
where
Gijkl =
∫ (i+1)σbin
iσbin
∫ (j+1)σbin
jσbin
FT2
[∫ (k+1)δν
kδν
∫ (l+1)δν
lδν
ψ(ωA, ωB)dωAdωB
]
dtAdtb (6)
. The probability of Alice and Bob projecting into time bins |σibin,A〉 and |σjbin,B〉 and frequency
bins |νkA〉 and |νlB〉 is pi,j,k,l = | 〈σibin, σjbin, νkA, νlB | Ψ¯〉|2 = |Gi,j,k,l|2. We label the frequency bins so
that for k = l, the center frequencies of these bins add to the pump frequency. We plot the mutual
information in Fig. 2b as a function of the number of spectral channels added. The wave function is a
two-dimensional Gaussian. As we increase the number of spectral channels, the mutual information
(MI) increases, however the timing correlations eventually start to decrease, as the filtered photons
extend into neighboring time bins. Jitter is also a very important to the MI calculation. We include
this in the inset to Fig. 2b.
B. Detector timing jitter
Detector timing jitter refers to the added uncertainty in the photon detection time of some
stimulus, purely a result of detector electronics. Superconducting nanowire single photon detectors
and InGaAs APDs both exhibit jitter of roughly 30 to 40 ps [10]. We model timing jitter as a
Gaussian projection, σˆdet =
∫
e−t
2
x/2σ
2
det |t〉 〈t+ tx| dtx. The jitter profile of a real photodetector
is not truly Gaussian and can be quite asymmetric, however (1) this model allows for first-order
7analysis and (2) certain single photon detectors do have approximately Gaussian timing jitter [7].
If we apply σˆdet on both Alice and Bob’s photons, assuming the two-dimensional Gaussian given
earlier, we get
σˆdet,Aσˆdet,B |Ψ〉 ∝
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
[ −(tA + tB)2
4σ2det + 16σ
2
coh
]
exp
[ −(tA − tB)2
4σ2det + 4σ
2
cor
]
eiωp(tA+tB)/2 |tA, tB〉 dtAdtB
(7)
Since σcoh  σdet, the most important effect of jitter is to increase the observed correlation time
roughly from σcor to σdet. This can have a significant effect on the mutual information between
Alice and Bob if σdet is on the order of σbin, as shown in Fig. 2b.
III. SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION
A. Lossy Franson interferometry
The Franson interference derived in the text assumes lossless propagation through the interferom-
eter. This assumption is not valid in photonic integrated chips or fiber networks. We can account
for loss in our analysis by adding a virtual beam splitter in the long path of the otherwise-lossless
Franson, which couples the waveguide mode with a vacuum mode (see Fig. 4). We work in the
Heisenberg construction, evolving the annihilation operator through the virtual-loss beam splitter
and the two Franson beam splitters. The matrix for beam splitters 1 and 2, which leave the third
mode undisturbed is given by
Uˆi =
 √ri √1− ri 0√1− ri −√ri 0
0 0 1
 (8)
where i ∈ 1, 2. The virtual-loss beam splitter is given by
UˆL =
1 0 00 √tL √1− tL
0
√
1− tL −
√
tL
 (9)
The resulting annihilation operators are then aˆA(tA) = C1aˆ(t) + C2aˆ(t − ∆t) and aˆB(tB) =
C1aˆ(t)+C2aˆ(t−∆t−δt), disregarding the vacuum term, which will not affect coincidence counting.
C1 =
√
r1
√
r2 and C2 =
√
1− r1
√
1− r2
√
tL. For r1 = r2 = 1/2, and tL = e
−2t/τα where τα is the
lifetime of the photon in the interferometer arm, the visibility simplifies to
VPIC =
2e−2∆t/τα
1 + e−4∆t/τα
e−δt
2/2σ2core−∆t
2/2σ2coh . (10)
However for maximum visibility, C1 = C2, so
√
r1
√
r2√
1− r1
√
1− r2
=
√
tL. (11)
The Franson beam splitters can therefore be tuned to account for loss in the interferometer.
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FIG. 4: The eFI with an additional virtual beam splitter for loss in the long arm.
B. Eve and the wave function
We focus on the case of a single eavesdropper measuring a single photon of the photon pair. Eve’s
temporal measurement is a Gaussian filtering function
Eˆt =
∫ ∞
−∞
e−t
2/2(σEcoh)
2 |t〉 〈t| dt (12)
Following [4], the amplitude function
ψ(tA, tB) ∝ exp[−(tA − tB)2/4σ2cor] exp[−t2A/4σ2coh]eiωp(tA+tB)/2, (13)
for σcoh  σcor. Therefore
|ΨE〉 = Eˆt |Ψ〉 (14)
∝
∫ ∞
−∞
∫ ∞
−∞
exp
[
−t2A
(
1
4σ2coh
+
1
4(σEcoh)
2
)]
exp
[−(tA − tB)2
4σ2cor
]
eiωp(tA+tB)/2 |tA, tB〉
so the coherence time of the biphoton packet is strongly influenced by Eve’s timing resolution when
σEcoh  σcoh. Similarly, we define a weak spectral POVM,
Eˆω =
∫ ∞
−∞
e−(σ
E
cor)
2(ω−ωp/2)2 |ω〉 〈ω| dω (15)
For 1/σcor  1/σcoh, |Ψ〉 can be written in the spectral-domain representation as follows
|Ψ〉 ∝
∫ ∫
exp[−σ2cor/4(2ωA − ωp)2] exp[−σ2coh(ωA + ωB − ωp)2] |ωA, ωB〉 dωAdωB , (16)
from which we find that
Eˆω |Ψ〉 ∝
∫ ∫
exp[−(σ2cor/4 + (σEcor)2/4)(2ωA − ωp)2] (17)
× exp[−σ2coh(ωA + ωB − ωp)2] |ωA, ωB〉 dωAdωB .
9Thus, Eve projects the biphoton pair onto a narrower frequency distribution. Reverting to the
time-domain representation we get
Eˆω |Ψ〉 ∝
∫ ∫
exp(−t2A/4σ2coh) exp[−(tA − tB)2/4(σEcor)2]eiωp(tA+tB)/2 |tA, tB〉 dtAdtB , (18)
for σcor  σEcor  σcoh.
[1] N. Gisin, G. Ribordy, W. Tittel, and H. Zbinden, Rev. Mod. Phys. 74, 145 (2002).
[2] N. J. Cerf, M. Bourennane, A. Karlsson, and N. Gisin, Phys. Rev. Lett. 88, 127902 (2002).
[3] H. Bechmann-Pasquinucci and W. Tittel, Phys. Rev. A 61, 062308 (2000).
[4] I. Ali-Khan, C. J. Broadbent, and J. C. Howell, Phys. Rev. Lett. 98, 060503 (2007).
[5] J. T. Barreiro, T.-C. Wei, and P. G. Kwiat, Nature Physics 4, 282 (2008).
[6] Y. H. Shih and C. O. Alley, Phys. Rev. Lett. 61, 2921 (1988).
[7] E. Dauler, B. Robinson, A. Kerman, J. Yang, E. Rosfjord, V. Anant, B. Voronov, G. Gol’tsman, and
K. Berggren, Applied Superconductivity, IEEE Transactions on 17, 279 (2007).
[8] C. K. Law and J. H. Eberly, Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 127903 (2004).
[9] J. D. Franson, Phys. Rev. Lett. 62, 2205 (1989).
[10] R. H. Hadfield, Nature Photonics 3, 696 (2009).
[11] M. A. Foster, R. Salem, D. F. Geraghty, A. C. Turner-Foster, M. Lipson, and A. L. Gaeta, Nature
456, 81 (2008).
[12] Time-lens approaches [11] may be used to stretch time by some factor NTL, but this requires the
protocol to be run in bursts so that neighboring intervals do not overlap; up-conversion detectors can
offer very short timing resolution, but introduce too many dark counts in the continuously running
protocol
